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Abstract
This paper develops a political economy model of multiple unemployment equilibria to provide a theory
of an endogenous natural rate of unemployment. This model is applied to the UK and the US interwar period
which is remembered as the decade of mass unemployment. The theory here sees the natural rate and the
associated path of unemployment as a reaction to shocks (mainly demand in nature) and the institutional
structure of the economy. The channel through which these two forces feed on each other is a political
economy process whereby voters with limited information on the natural rate react to shocks by demanding
more or less social protection. The reduced form results obtained confirm a pattern of unemployment
behaviour in which unemployment moves between high and low equilibria in response to shocks.
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1. Introduction
Much of postwar unemployment policy has its roots in the experience of mass unemployment in the
interwar period. Unemployment in both the USA and UK reached levels that hitherto had never been
experienced in either economy. In the UK, the vision of the ‘army of one million unemployed ’ men after world
war one had powerfully etched itself into the collective memory of the electorate and the politico-economic
establishment. Not until the economic reforms of Mrs Thatcher did the UK economy, and importantly the
voting public, wean themselves oﬀ the postwar thinking of demand management. Between 1929 and 1933
in the USA, unemployment soared to 25 per cent of the workforce. The political economy that underscored
Roosevelt’s ‘New Deal’ remained with the economic establishment until the Reagan tax reforms of the 1980s.
The puzzle for the USA is that despite the best eﬀorts of the New Deal, unemployment remained stubbornly
high and refused to fall below 15 per cent. The puzzle for the UK was that during the half century before
the First World War, real income grew at a rate of 2 per cent a year but unemployment averaged less than
4 per cent; from 1920 to 1938, real income continued to grow by about the same rate, but unemployment
averaged 14 per cent.
This paper argues that shocks causing sharp cyclical demand swings generate political reactions from
public opinion and vested interests, which in turn produce fiscal and monetary (demand policy) responses and
also changes in supply-side policy, i.e., policy aﬀecting the equilibrium values of real variables or ‘natural
rates’. Specifically, bad demand shocks tend to produce supply policy that distorts the market because
these shocks generate demands for protection; these distortions in turn produce an equilibrium with a higher
natural rate of unemployment which in turn can reinforce the demands for yet more protection, until matters
are bad enough to create a political equilibrium where the bad eﬀects cause enough opposition to yet more
distortions.
Vice versa, a good run of demand shocks produces more liberal supply-side policies as people are less ner-
vous about potential misfortune. This again is self-reinforcing so that the economy moves in a virtuous circle
to a low-unemployment high-output equilibrium. The dynamics of unemployment exhibit three equilibria-
one stable low unemployment equilibrium, one stable high unemployment equilibrium and a non-stable
intermediate unemployment equilibrium that lies between the two.
The model of political economy of supply-side policies in this paper is similar to Wright (1986). In
Wright (1986), workers have diﬀerent unemployment risks, and unemployment benefits play the sole role of
an insurance against adverse shocks. The median voter will optimally determine unemployment benefits by
weighing their benefits (in terms of better insurance) against their costs (in terms of higher taxes). Thus,
the more exposed to unemployment is the median voter, the higher the political support for unemployment
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benefits, much as in Meltzer and Richard (1981) the median voter’s support for redistributive taxation varies
with the state of the economy. However as noted by St-Paul (1996), this prediction neglects other eﬀects
of unemployment benefits to the extent that higher wages lower job creation and harm the unemployed.
Therefore, a higher exposure of the employed to unemployment will tend to moderate the desire of the
median voter for a high benefit level. St-Paul also analyses how labour market institutions can aﬀect the
median voter’s choice.
The political economy model of institutions in this paper extends the analysis of Meltzer and Richard
(1981), Wright (1986) and St-Paul (1996). Long-lasting shocks to the economy lead to demand for social
protection (identified with the benefit/wage -or replacement- ratio). However, we also take into account
the feedback distortionary eﬀect of benefits on unemployment which progressively raises the chances of
unemployment for the median voter. We therefore address the missing channel of Wright (1986) of how
labour market institutions can aﬀect the welfare of the decisive voter, as suggested by St-Paul (1996).
This paper joins a large literature on the creation and evolution of the institutions that favour or inhibit
capitalist growth (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and Roderick, 1993; Perotti, 1993;
Stokey and Rebelo, 1993, and Krusell et al, 1994). It also joins a set of other studies explaining the rise
in unemployment since the 1970s in terms of macroeconomic shocks interacting with institutional patterns
(see Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Fitoussi et al., 2000; Bertola et al., 2001; and Nickell et al., 2005).
Our contribution here (and in Minford and Naraidoo, 2004, for postwar unemployment) is to view these
interactions as the product of a political economy process.
This paper is organised along the following lines. The next section sketches the theoretical framework
that produces circles of a vicious or virtuous nature. Section 3 embeds the framework within the historical
context of the interwar period. Section 4 estimates the reduced form dynamic unemployment function which
is capable of producing a three equilibrium unemployment case consistent with the experience of the interwar
period. A bootstrapping procedure is included to test the prevalence of the 3-equilibrium case. In section
5 we test the reduced form model against a general model of hysteresis by providing out-of-sample forecast
accuracy tests. Section 6 concludes.
2. Vicious and Virtuous Circles
This section sketches the theoretical framework that produces vicious and virtuous circles in unemploy-
3
ment1. The basic idea is that the natural rate of unemployment is an endogenous variable that gets pushed
from a low position to a high position by the interaction of demand shocks and institutional responses. These
two forces are interlinked by a political economy mechanism whereby voters with limited information on the
natural rate of unemployment react to negative shocks by demanding protection which creates the vicious
circle.
Bad situations can generate political demands for reform which can cut into a vicious circle (one example
is Margaret Thatcher’s reforms in the UK during the eighties and in the USA the Carter deregulation of the
1970’s and the Reagan tax reforms of the 1980’s); and equally that very long periods of good fortune can
also generate a complacent attitude towards distortions whereby for example it is felt that ‘social justice’ can
be ‘aﬀorded’ through higher social protection, worker rights and so on. These political developments act as
an additional source of shocks, over and above demand shocks, that can start a move towards respectively
a good or bad equilibrium. There are intimate linkages through political economy between the two sorts of
policies, namely, demand-management and supply side policies, and these links have the capacity to create
both vicious and virtuous circles of economic performance.
A good example is the USA interwar period. In the 1920s it was a high-performing economy with
full employment but in the 1930s it was in deep slump leading to heavy regulatory intervention and the
protectionism that made matters worse for all. Another case is Japan from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s,
and then again from 1990 onwards. A miracle of rapid, unstoppable growth in the first and a hopeless
stagnation in the second. A further case is continental Europe which appeared to do nothing wrong in the
1960s and 1970s and yet, the role was reversed in the 1980s and 1990s.
Getting out of this state requires either a big positive shock to output and employment (for the USA; the
Second World War) or a determined broad-based reform programme (the UK in 1979), which revives popular
faith in market economics. Once popular confidence is built up, the demands for protection evaporate and
in their place, people and business demand freedom. Then, the virtuous circle operates and the economy
settles at a high-employment equilibrium.
The theory consists of two components: a model of the natural rate and a model of the political economy
of supply-side policy (particularly towards the central labour market). We discuss each in turn.
As outlined by Siebert (1997), starting from a simple notion of an equilibrium in a classically clearing
labour market, institutional arrangements can influence the clearing function of the labour market in basically
three ways: by weakening the demand for labour, making it less attractive to hire a worker by explicitly
pushing up wage costs or by introducing a negative shadow price for labour; by distorting labour supply; and
1For a fuller exposition see Minford and Naraidoo (2004)
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by impairing the equilibrating function of the market mechanism (for instance, by influencing bargaining
behaviour). To these interventions may be added those of trade unions (see Blanchard and Katz, 1997).
Our set-up for the labour market follows that of Minford (1983). He took the classical labour supply
set-up and added the idea of a permanent unemployment benefit, payable without check on work availability.
The result was to tilt the labour supply curve so that the real wage oﬀer never fell below the benefit level,
as shown in Fig. 1. Should the benefit level rise relative to productivity, unemployment will increase.
That is, people will voluntarily refuse to take available wage oﬀers because benefits are preferable; they are
‘unemployed’ in the sense that they are not working but are ‘available for work’.
 
Real 
Wages 
Real 
Unemployment 
Benefits Natural Rate of Unemployment 
Employment 
Normal 
Supply of 
Labour 
Labour 
Force 
Marginal 
Product of 
Labour 
Figure 1: The Natural Rate of Unemployment
These ideas can be summarised in the following model of structural unemployment2. In our analysis we
focus purely on benefits, because this will be the choice variable for voters under our political economy model
below; such things as taxation and public expenditure, union power, and minimum wages are also potential
choice variables but for simplicity we leave them out of the explicit model,
2Later versions have proliferated; in the UK, Layard and Nickell (1986) estimated a similar model, and Bean et al. (1986)
attempted to extend it to other European countries which began to experience rising unemployment UK-style during the late
1980s and 1990s. It turns out that in each country there are substantial idiosyncracies in the social support mechanisms,
complicating eﬀective modelling of the natural unemployment rate.
In more recent empirical works, Nickell(1997), Nickell and Layard(1998) and OECD (1999) suggest that structural unemploy-
ment in major OECD economies is associated with the following labour market features: (a) generous unemployment benefits
that are allowed to run on indefinitely, combined with little or no pressure on the unemployed to obtain work, (b) high union-
isation with wages bargained collectively and no coordination between either unions or employers in wage bargaining and (c)
high overall taxes impinging on labour or a combination of high minimum wages for young people associated with high payroll
taxes.
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lnUt = u0 + δln(
Bt
Wt
) + u1t + u
c
t (1)
where u0 is a constant, Bt is the real benefit rate , Wt is real wages (set it is assumed by productivity), u
c
t
is cyclical unemployment, and u1t represents other persistent influences on unemployment, an error process
assumed therefore to display high serial correlation. Examples of such influences would be demographic
shifts (such as a rise in working age population), and sectoral shifts like a decline in manufacturing. These
influences will have no long-run eﬀect on unemployment but their eﬀect is assumed to be long drawn out.
This eﬀect provokes a political economy response. In our model, the median voter holds some non-
human capital but nevertheless relies heavily on income from human capital. If this voter experiences
unemployment spells, unemployment benefits yield a much needed replacement of wage income. The higher
level of unemployment means that agents are more exposed to the risk of being unemployed which therefore
increases their desired benefit/wage ratio. However, we also take into account the feedback distortionary
eﬀect of benefit on unemployment which increases the probability of unemployment for the median voter.
Hence,.as unemployment rises, the median voter’s demands for benefits rise but at a diminishing rate, as
these higher benefits progressively raise the chances of unemployment.
Suppose we define an index, Bt, as the level and duration (overall ‘generosity’) of real unemployment
benefits; for short we shall refer to it as ‘benefits’ (the same as in Eq. (1)). Our analysis (for details see
Appendix A) implies that the log of the benefit/wage ratio is a quadratic in the rate of unemployment, Ut,
or say :
ln(
Bt
Wt
) = B0 + ϕ(Ut−1 − z)− β(Ut−1 − z)2 + ²t (2)
Initially a rise in unemployment above some normal rate, z, would trigger demands for higher benefits,
but as unemployment rises, the rising chances of unemployment become an increasingly restraining factor.
In Eq. (2), B0 is a minimum benefit/wage ratio set in normal circumstances and ϕ and β are constants.
Combining Eqs. (1) and (2) leads to the following log-linear dynamic unemployment model:
lnUt = (u0 + δB0 − δϕz − δβz2) + (δϕ+ 2δβz)Ut−1 − δβU2t−1 + u1t + uct + δ²t (3)
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or more compactly:
lnUt = a0 + a1Ut−1 + a2U
2
t−1 + ξt (4)
3. Interwar Unemployment
The period between the two world wars has been the source of much contemporary economic, social
and policy lessons. The conventional view that aggregate demand deficiency was the principal cause of
unemployment in interwar Britain was first challenged by Benjamin and Kochin (1979) who argued that part
of the explanation for the high level of unemployment was due to the generosity of unemployment benefits
relative to wages. While Benjamin and Kochin’s explanation has been hotly contested in the academic
literature3 , a consensus view is that supply as well as demand shocks mattered to varying degrees4. More
recently Benjamin and Matthews (1992) have challenged the perceived diﬀerences between the UK and US
experiences of interwar unemployment. While demand factors mattered a great deal in the case of the USA,
supply factors in the form of public relief contributed to the high level of unemployment that persisted up
until the eve of the second world war5. This section reviews unemployment policy in both countries between
the wars with the aim of demonstrating the reinforcing reaction of supply policy to negative demand shocks.
The earliest plan for a national unemployment insurance scheme in the UK (National Insurance Act
1911) was based on the assumption that unemployment was caused by temporary maladjustments in the
labour market. Unemployment benefit grounded on the principles of insurance together with the savings
of individual worker was to provide a short-term tide-over until re-employment. In his presidential address
to the British Association in 1910, Sir Hubert Lewellyn-Smith, co-author with Sir William Beveridge of the
unemployment section of the NI Bill stated:
“The scheme must avoid encouraging unemployment and for this reason the rate of unemployment benefit
shall be relatively low. It would be fatal for any scheme to oﬀer compensation for unemployment at a rate
approximating to that of ordinary wages”. But it was precisely on this principle that Bakke (1935) noted
that the battle between insurance and maintenance was fought. It was the results of this battle that led
Beveridge in his testimony to the Royal Commission on Unemployment Insurance in 1931 to describe the
3See for example the special issue of the Journal of Political Economy 2, 90, 1982 devoted to the critics and the reply
Benjamin and Kochin (1982)
4For example Matthews (1986) argues that both supply and demand shocks mattered with balance in favour of supply
shocks, whereas Broadberry (1986) argues the reverse.
5See for example Wallis and Benjamin (1981).
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process as “a development from insurance by contract to relief by status” and whereas in the past he referred
to “insurance popularly miscalled the dole” he went on to refer to the “dole oﬃcially miscalled insurance”6.
The unemployment insurance system in the UK that developed after the first world war was fundamentally
diﬀerent from its original inception. The Unemployment Act of 1920 removed many of the former system’s
safeguards and increased benefits by nearly 40 per cent and extended the coverage to a further 11 million
workers. In the following decade, the expansion of the insurance system was achieved by relaxation of the
contributory requirement, the extension of the duration and the allowance of additional weeks of special
benefits. Several forces combined to put pressure on the system to push the unemployment benefit system
from insurance to maintenance. The immediate post world war one system of unemployment relief for
uninsured workers was the local authority administered system of poor law relief. The financial burden of
providing unemployment relief brought many a local authority close to bankruptcy. In 1923 the Minister of
Labour reported that he was impressed with the plea not only from the Poor Law Guardians, and Workmans
Associations but also from employers, that benefit be extended to the uninsured. The political position of
both the T.U.C. and the Independent Labour Party was ‘work or maintenance’. In 1924, the Minister of
Health received a deputation from the Poor Law Authorities complaining that the burden of unemployment
relief could not and was never intended to be met from the local authority finances7. By 1931, ‘need’
had completely replaced ‘insurance’ as a criterion for transitional and unemployment benefits. The Royal
Commission of 1932 stated:
“Each successive government has made changes to the scheme, which have been determined less by the
need for careful balancing of income and expenditure than by a desire to attract, or do as little as possible
to repel electoral support.”8
The relaxation of the insurance rules was also accompanied with a continuous increase in the average level
of benefit. The increase in benefit was even more pronounced when the cost of living was taken into account.
In its recommendation for a reduction in the level of benefits the Royal Commission on Unemployment
Insurance 1931 stated:
“If a comparison be made between that rates of benefit paid in August 1924, in 1928 and now proposed
by us, with adjustments corresponding to changes in the cost of living index...it will be clear that the rates
which we propose are in eﬀect higher than those in operation in the more prosperous years of 1924 and
1928”. Appendix B provides graphs of annual data on unemployment benefits and average earnings series
6See Bakke (1935) p.17
7Bakke (1935) p.147
8Royal Commission 1932, p.164
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for the UK9 for the period 1920-38, together with an explanation on their patterns.
Turning to the case of the USA, there was no centralised system of unemployment relief at the end of the
first world war. Up until the 1930s, unemployment relief was local government based combined with private
charitable organisations. The unprecedented unemployment and financial hardship that followed the ‘Great
Depression’ brought forth a considerable expansion of relief activities. But it was not until 1932 with the
establishment of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) that the federal government began to play
a role in the relief. However this system was largely ineﬀective as it disbursed funds to private businesses
rather than directly to unemployment persons and required the condition that all locally funded relief be
exhausted.
In 1933 the newly elected President Roosevelt supplanted the RFC with the Federal Emergency Relief
Administration (FERA), which was to spend $3 billion on unemployment relief. FERA represented a funda-
mental change in philosophy. Its principal aim was to put financial assistance directly into the hands of the
unemployment through cash grants and work relief. Recipients of FERA were occasionally required to take
part in public works programmes but it was far more commonplace for no work requirements be made. The
FERA was phased out in 1935 which was replaced by the Works Progress Administration (WPA). This was
a programme that explicitly established a ‘nation-wide’ system of work relief. Individual relief was based on
‘needs’ levels and local pay which determined the number of work hours contributed to WPA programmes10.
However, those who were either unable to work or did not have suitable skills for WPA programmes were
eligible for general relief which was an unconditional cash grant11. This combination of work relief and
general relief remained in existence until the onset of the second world war. The conclusion of Benjamin
and Matthews (1992) in their analysis of the unemployment relief in the USA was that the FERA and WPA
programmes did prolong the manifestations of the Great Depression. In the relief programme is the expla-
nation why by 1939 when per capita real income was only 4 per cent below its 1929 peak, unemployment
was 17.2 per cent compared with 3.2 per cent in 1929. Table 1 summarises the minimum and maximum
values of each unemployment series, together with their mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis.
What is remarkable about the data is its similarity in the mean and the volatility within each unemployment
series. However, the higher standard deviation for the USA indicates the greater volatility in the economy
during the 1930s. A look at the graphs of the two variables in Appendix C shows distinctive jumps in the
9The only country for which we have been able to gather some data.
10So for example if a person’s need level was evaluated at $60 a month and the local pay for that person’s occupation was
$0.60 per hour, the recepient would work 100 hours on the WPA programme.
11Benjamin and Matthews (1992) estimate a demand for unemployment relief by State which depended on the size of the
population, the proportion of farm population, proportion of black population, the growth of per capita state income and the
level of benefits. They conclude that for every 10 people taken oﬀ the unemployment queue through WPA relief, a further 9
joined it.
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unemployment series: the UK series in the beginning of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s, the USA
in the early 1930s. In the UK, the unemployment rate was as high as it was in every year from 1921 to
1938 than from the cumulated unemployment rates from 1857 to 1920. The explanation for the jumps in
the UK unemployment rate was that after the First World War, faced with wartime inflation and at the
same time a commitment of the government to return the pound to its pre-war parity of $4.86/$1, there
was a vigorous monetary restriction in the hope for a return to gold at pre-war parity. In a world where
few prices were perfectly flexible, a temporary rise in unemployment was the price to be paid for reversal of
inflation. Unemployment soon rocketed from a low of 4 per cent in 1920 to over 20 per cent in 1921. But
we argue that the temporary rise in unemployment set in motion the political economy forces that drove
the economy to a high unemployment equilibrium. Similarly for the USA, the growing prosperity across the
nation endengered rising confidence in the future, a confidence that manifested itself in sharply rising land
and stock prices in the late 1920s. In an eﬀort to halt what it perceived to be speculative trading on the
stock market, the Fed moved in 1929 to restrict bank’s access to funds that were to be used for what the
Fed viewed as speculative purposes. Bank found themselves unable to accommodate the credit demands of
their customers and a wave of selling, culminated to the stock market crash of October 1929, produced a
hike in interest rates and a crunch in aggregate demand. This soon caused the unemployment rate in the
USA to climb to over 20 per cent which in turn set in train the political economy forces discussed above that
sustained the economy at a high unemployment equilibrium such as that of Great Britain.
Table 1
Observed unemployment rate series(%)
min Ut max Ut Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis
UK 0.3 23.4 7.5 5.7 0.90 2.95
USA 0.3 25.6 6.4 7.3 1.05 2.70
4. Econometric Results
Eq. (4) in the text is estimated using monthly unemployment series for the UK (1887.01-1939.10, 634
observations) and the USA (1906.06-1942.06, 433 observations)- data in Appendix C. The results from
estimating model (4), treating u1t + u
c
t + δ²t as a composite error term are presented in Table 2. We report
the ordinary least squares estimates for the model, together with their Newey-West standard errors which
correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. The Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test shows
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation.12.
12On the argument that one-lag may not adequately capture the political economy process, a test of statistical diﬀerence
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Table 2
Log-linear dynamic unemployment modela
constant Ut−1 U
2
t−1 ξt−1 ξt−2 ξt−3 ξt−4 seb R¯2 LMc
Countries
UK 0.048 0.318∗∗ -0.009∗∗ 0.373∗∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.185∗∗ 0.093∗ 0.183 0.963 2.08
(0.030) (0.006) (0.000) (0.138) (0.046) (0.078) (0.051) (0.126)
USA -0.443∗∗ 0.368∗∗ -0.009∗∗ 0.602∗∗ 0.175∗∗ 0.330 0.946 2.10
(0.031) (0.008) (0.000) (0.108) (0.062) (0.110)
Two asterisks denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and one asterisk at the 10% level.
aNewey-West corrected standard errors in parenthesis.
bStandard error of regression.
cBreusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM Test. p value in parenthesis.
The key parameter aˆ2 is negative and significant in both the UK and the USA cases, implying mean
reversion. Taking the exponential function of the estimated equation and setting the supply and demand
shocks to zero, we can focus on the deterministic path of unemployment. The estimated function can be
solved by setting Ut − ea0+a1Ut−1+a2U
2
t−1 = 0 and plotting the corresponding values in Figs. 2 and 3 below.
The computed unemployment equilibria (low, middle and high) is shown in Table 3 for the one-lag and 12th
lag case.
Fig. 2: UK Phase Diagram Fig. 3: USA Phase Diagram
Table 3
The estimated equilibria
Countries
lag 1 lag 1 lag 12 lag 12
UK USA UK USA
low u 1.7 0.9 2.46 1.50
middle u 9.8 10.4 10.75 13.76
high u 18.2 20.9 15.80 19.97
The dynamics and equilibria of unemployment can be interpreted by inspecting Figs. 2 and 3 which use
the estimates from the one-lag case. The low unemployment equilibrium is a stable position and conforms
in the parameters (aˆ0,aˆ1 and aˆ2) is conducted by including diﬀerent lags of the variable Ut (of up to the 12th order) in our
political process for both the UK and the USA. Appendix D illustrates our procedure and provides the main results.
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with the historical experience of the pre-first world war period. Once the economy experiences large demand
shocks, unemployment follows more persistent dynamics but mean reverts globally, implying a high unem-
ployment equilibrium rate. The political process discussed earlier comes into play following large shocks to
the economy. The estimates suggest a plausibly high top equilibrium rate of unemployment in both coun-
tries during the 3-equilibrium period. The UK estimate of 18.2% is consistent with Matthews’ (1986) finding
based on a full macroeconomic model, that the natural rate of unemployment increased substantially during
the 1930s. The top equilibrium rate of unemployment in the USA which amounts to nearly 11 million per-
sons, is harder to explain. On average, nearly a quarter of the unemployed during the 1930s were in receipt
of relief payments. Benjamin and Matthews (1992) estimate that nearly 1 million may have been added to
the unemployed through the rise in real relief payments in the 1930s, and a further 3 million private sector
jobs would have been crowded out by the end of the period through the creation of public sector relief jobs.
This suggests that nearly half of the average level of unemployment during the period (1931-39) could be
accounted for through the eﬀects of Federal unemployment policy. However, Benjamin and Matthews (1992)
estimates are based on a partial equilibrium analysis and the results in a full general equilibrium framework
are likely to be higher.
Another econometric issue relates to the robustness of statistical inference on the parameters - aˆ0, aˆ1 and
aˆ2. According to our theory the error terms are autocorrelated. Hence, the standard error associated with
the estimators is likely to be biased. It follows, that a ‘t’ - or normal distribution may not approximate the
actual empirical distribution of the parameters particularly well. The approach taken here is to augment
our results by deriving standard errors and actual confidence intervals for the distribution of the relevant
coeﬃcients by means of bootstrap procedure, originally developed by Efron (1979) and reviewed by Li and
Maddala(1996).13
The full-sample bootstrap results based on 600 re-estimations for both countries are presented in Table
4. The summary of the results of the bootstrap are very similar to the OLS results and the point estimates
of the standard errors are similar to those obtained from the Newey-West correction.
13The basic idea of the bootstrap procedure used is easily outlined. Essentially artificial data is created by resampling the
error terms obtained from estimating the initial sample itself. This resampling procedure is repeated 600 times to generate 600
samples for each country. Then Eq. (4) in the text is reestimated for each of the 600 artificial samples. Circularity is involved
since we have to choose an estimator in the first place to obtain the sample of the error distributions. One of the problems
in our bootstrap is the presence in certain residuals of autocorrelations. This implies that the errors cannot be regarded as
random and are therefore unsuitable for resampling in any order. Therefore the errors used in this stage have all been purged
oﬀ autocorrelation at the original estimation of Eq. (4) in the text, by the inclusion of appropriate autocorrelation parameters
in the model itself. The latter is then used for the bootstrapping exercise.The results are little diﬀerent from those with 300
bootstraps, suggesting that the distributions have well converged by 600. We therefore set the number of bootstraps to 600.
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Table 4
Bootstrap estimatesa and confidence intervals based on 600 re-estimations
Countries aˆ0 95% C.I aˆ1 95% C.I aˆ2 95% C.I
UK 0.0474 0.016,0.078 0.3184 0.310,0.326 -0.0087 -0.009,-0.008
(0.0158) (0.0043) (0.0002)
USA -0.4429 -0.484,-0.400 0.3680 0.352,0.384 -0.0096 -0.010,-0.009
(0.0212) (0.0085) (0.0004)
aStandard errors in parenthesis.
However, the key issue of this paper is whether a country is or is not subject to vicious/virtuous circles,
in the sense of having three equilibria (the middle one being unstable) rather than merely one. Our central
results imply that both countries have experienced 3-equilibrium situations over the sample period. Therefore
we wish to develop a statistical test on the joint values of the 3 parameters (aˆ0, aˆ1, aˆ2) determining the number
of equilibria. For this we turn to the bootstrapped joint parameter distribution which reveals the statistical
possibilities. As it turned out, the parameter combinations for both countries generated only 3-equilibrium
outcomes. This tells us that the estimated distribution of the parameters only admits of the 3-equilibrium
case. Thus we cannot possibly reject the hypothesis of both countries being 3-equilibrium.
Can we however also reject the hypothesis of them being 1-equilibrium? That is, could a 1-equilibrium
model generate 3-equilibrium cases like those we estimated for each country? To answer this, we bootstrap a
model that lies on the borderline between the 1-equilibriumn and the 3-equilibrium cases. Such a model can
be defined as one for which the slope of the phase diagram in its middle or average region (σ) is unity14. Fig.
4 illustrates this point. On the left is the UK’s interwar phase diagram and corresponding slope. On the right
is the USA’s postwar equivalent from Minford and Naraidoo (2004). This is a borderline case where there is
(just) one equilibrium; a slight displacement of the constant would give three. In the middle region the slope
is unity, i.e., σ = 1. Plainly in the UK interwar case σ Â 1. For an unambiguous 1-equilibrium case, σ would
be less than 1. σ is thus a measure of the extent to which the combination of parameters diverges in either
direction from the borderline case. We can generate its bootstrapped distribution for the two countries from
the interwar errors, under the assumption that the true σ is unity and given by the postwar US parameters.
Table 5 and Fig 5 show these distributions, together with the estimated bσ for interwar UK and US. Plainly
these bσ convincingly reject the hypothesis that σ = 1.
14σ = ∂Ut/∂Ut−1 at mean unemployment, U= (a1 + 2 ∗ a2 ∗ U) exp(a0 + a1U + a2U)
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Fig. 4. Features of 1-equilibrium and 3-equilibrium models.
Table 5
Summary Statistics for the Slope Estimate σ
Countries UK USA
Mean 0.993 0.993
Std Deviation 0.016 0.041
95% C.I 0.960,1.026 0.915,1.075
99% C.I 0.952,1.034 0.897,1.099
Estimated bσ 1.25 1.12
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Fig. 5. Countries Distribution over σ
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5. Testing the Reduced Form Equation against Rival ‘General Hysteresis’ Models
The reduced form equations we have estimated are derived from the theoretical model set out above.
However, other models have been proposed that make unemployment dependent on its past. The term
‘hysteresis’ suggests that the current equilibrium unemployment rate may depend strongly on the past level
of actual unemployment. Steadily increasing European unemployment rates over the past two decades have
challenged the existence of a unique equilibrium rate of unemployment and nurtured the idea that the
equilibrium rate of unemployment, at least to some extent, tracks the actual rate. Blanchard and Summers
(1986) developed a model along these lines, focusing on Europe in the 1980s where there were large negative
shocks and institutional arrangements which led to the disenfranchisement of ’outsiders’ (i.e. unemployed
workers who will typically not be union members), with unions bargaining only on behalf of their employed
members. In the simplest case where unions simply set wages to ensure the employment of their current
members but not to permit the firm to do any hiring (of outsiders), the wage-setting relation and the labour
demand curve will coincide allowing for a continuum of equilibria following adverse shocks. Their model
suggests a unit root in the level of unemployment. Røed (1997) has reviewed the literature on hysteresis
whereby a variety of theories have been proposed for the existence of such hysteresis and has concluded that
the unit root hypothesis (pure hysteresis) has rarely been rejected in the relevant theory; let us call them
models of ‘generalised hysteresis’.15 These models do not in general have the same implications as ours that
there may be two stable equilibria; rather they suggest that unemployment has great persistence and may
be non-stationary. If non-stationary they would have potentially an infinite number of equilibria or natural
rates, each shock creating a new one.
While we would argue that the model set out is to be preferred on theoretical grounds to such alternative
models, nevertheless we also propose an empirical test of our reduced form against one of generalised hystere-
sis. We allow the alternative model to be represented by the best-fitting ARMA/ARIMA or non-linear time
series process we can find. As we will see, within sample the fit of such alternatives against our particular
form is barely distinguishable- not surprisingly given the high correlations between diﬀerent transformations
of unemployment and its lags. However, the key distinguishing feature of our model from these general time
series representations lies in its forecast implications, namely that the equilibrium to which the economy
returns depends on the size of the shocks; small shocks do not alter the economy’s local equilibrium but at
low unemployment large positive shocks drive unemployment to a high unemployment equilibrium, while
15Such models include models of regime-switching such as ours but with diﬀerent set-ups. We impose no restrictions here
on these alternatives. Further work could test particular fully-restricted models against ours seriatim, but that task lies well
beyond our scope here.
15
at high unemployment large shocks, both positive and negative, drive it back to low unemployment. A
general time series process will forecast unemployment either to stay roughly where it is if non-stationary;
or, if stationary, to revert to some deterministic equilibrium. Thus the rival models’ forecast implications
are quite diﬀerent; thus whichever of the models is well-specified should dominate the other in forecast per-
formance..We use this as the basis for a repeated forecasting test of specification, where we produce both
traditional and non-nested forecast tests for each date in the sample for each model.
Our purpose is to compare three alternative models; the reduced formmodel, the best fitting ARIMA/ARMA,
and the best-fitting non-linear time series process (represented by a polynomial in the log of unemployment
on its lags and powers of its lags). The best ARMA model turns out to be an AR(1) and the best polynomial
model is one where all the powers are insignificant, adding nothing to the AR(1) component. Hence the
chosen best rival model of hysteresis is simply one, an AR(1) with a root close to one, namely:
lnUt = α+ β lnUt−1 + ²t
Our model is denoted by M; the rival AR(1) model by R. Table 6 shows that based on the goodness
of fit measure (R¯2), the two models are virtually indistinguishable. The ratio σˆM/σˆR where σˆM , σˆR are
the residual standard errors of the M model and the R model respectively, provides a measure of in-sample
fit comparison for the alternative models. We devise a test of distinguishability based on the bootstrapped
distribution of σM/σR. To this end, we perform 1000 bootstraps of the M model to give 1000 pseudo samples
of the dependent variable yt, (= lnut) and we perform the same procedure for the R model. Under the null
hypothesis, the two processes are indistinguishable so that their predictions are the same. In this case the
bootstraps from each process can be pooled, i.e., we have 2000 samples out of the two lots of 1000. The
question then is, under this assumption that the two models are the same, what would be the distribution of
σM/σR? We obtain this by a regression of both M and R on the 2000 bootstraps. Based on their standard
errors, we compute the 95% limits of the σM/σR in Table 6. The estimated dσM/cσR based on the actual
samples for the UK and the USA are 1.18 and 0.97 respectively, both of which lie well within the 95%
interval; therefore we cannot reject the null hypothesis of indistinguishability for the in-sample fit.
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Table 6
AR(1) Model Statisticsa and In-sample fit comparison
constant lnUt−1 R¯
2 seb LMc R¯2 (M) R¯2 (R) 95% C.I of σM/σR σˆM/σˆR
UK 0.022 0.987∗∗ 0.973 0.155 1.054 0.96 0.97 0.935,1.230 1.182
(0.020) (0.009) (0.349)
USA 0.035∗ 0.971∗∗ 0.948 0.329 0.828 0.94 0.94 0.905,1.032 0.971
(0.020) (0.011) (0.363)
Two asterisks denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and one asterisk at the 10% level.
aNewey-West corrected standard errors in parenthesis.
bStandard error of regression.
cBreusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM Test. p value in parenthesis.
We now turn to comparison of the out-of-sample forecasts from the two alternative models. We retain
m = 60 observations for out-of-sample forecasting. In particular we will use dynamic out-of-sample forecast,
that is dynamic, multi-step forecasts starting from the first period in the forecast sample (1934/M11 for the
UK and from 1937/M7 for the USA). In order to test the null hypothesis of equal forecasting accuracy we
will employ forecast encompassing regressions, originally due to Chong and Hendry (1986), as generalised by
Marquez and Ericsson (1993); further developments are suggested by Fisher and Wallis (1990) and Andrews
et al. (1996). The original idea in this analysis is to regress the forecast error of one model on the other’s
forecasts. If the first model is correctly specified, there is no additional information contained in the other’s
forecasts that can help explain the forecast error of the first model. Moreover, the forecast error should
have zero mean; however this is not the main focus of the test, but rather whether the second model can
add information. The forecast encompassing regression is a restricted version of the pooling of forecasts
formula16.
yt = γo + γ1yˆt + γ2y
∗
t + εt; εt ∼ N(0,σ2)
where yˆt is the forecast of the maintained model (here ours, M), y
∗
t that of the other (here R).
The null-hypothesis is simply that yt − yˆt = εt, that is the forecast error be an innovation. The issue is
how best to test this null against the alternative that yt − y∗t = εt. First let γo be non-zero. Both Chong
and Hendry (1986) and Marquez and Ericsson (1993) suggest that
H0 : γ2 = 0 | γ1 = 1
is appropriate, whereas Fisher and Wallis (1990) suggest
H0 : γ2 = 0
A third possibility is suggested by Andrews et al. (1996)
16There is a large literature on pooling forecasts. See, for example, Holden and Peel (1988).
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H0 : γ2 = 0 | γ1 + γ2 = 1
which has two advantages. Writing the regression as
yt − yˆt = γo + γ2(y∗t − yˆt) + εt (5)
then if yt is integrated of order one, then all the variables in Eq. (5) are I(0) if we also make the extremely
plausible assumption that any forecast is cointegrated with its outturn. The second advantage is that the
model has a pooling of forecast interpretation where the weights (in our particular case (γ1 + γ2) sum to
unity). Therefore γo is an estimate of the average forecast error for the pooled forecast γ1yˆt + γ2y∗t . We
report results based on (5) following Andrews et al; however it turns out that the other methods give similar
results. .
Tables 7-9 presents forecast encompassing regressions under a variety of multi-step assumptions. For
Table 7 we calculate 1-step to 12-step ahead forecasts for five diﬀerent episodes, each of 12 months. After
each episode both models are re-estimated and the updated parameters are used to produce the forecasts for
the next episode. In Table 8 we look at the forecasting period as a whole and consider the 1-60 multi-step
forecasts across this whole period (thus the steps run from 1 to 60 months ahead). In Table 9 we compare
fixed k-step-ahead forecasts over this whole period; we set k=12 on the grounds that a year is the forecast
horizon of greatest interest to most forecasters. (For Table 8 the model is not re-estimated and for Table 9
the the model is re-estimated after each fixed k-step-ahead forecast).
What these results all show is that the (M-R) forecast helps a lot to explain the R forecast error in
both the UK and the USA cases whereas the (R-M) forecast only helps to explain the M forecast error to
a limited extent in the case of the UK and not at all in the USA case. Another way of putting this is that
for the UK the optimal weights on M and R are roughly 0.8 and 0.2 respectively, and for the US 1 and 0
respectively. Thus the general conclusion is that the R model is heavily dominated by our M model. In sum,
the out-of-sample forecasting test discriminates powerfully in favour of our specific nonlinear model against
one of generalised hysteresis.
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Table 7
Forecast Encompassing Regressiona- 1-12 months ahead, five episodes
Countries M-R R-M
constant (yˆt − y∗t ) seb R¯2 LMc constant (y∗t − yˆt) seb R¯2 LMc
UK 0.037∗∗ 0.773∗∗ 0.050 0.850 2.100 0.037∗∗ 0.227∗∗ 0.050 0.316 2.100
(0.008) (0.052) (0.115) (0.008) (0.053) (0.132)
USA 0.024 1.107∗∗ 0.221 0.855 25.378 0.024 0.107 0.221 0.038 25.378
(0.038) (0.187) (0.000) (0.038) (0.187) (0.000)
Two asterisks denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and one asterisk at the 10% level.
aNewey-West corrected standard errors in parenthesis.
bStandard error of regression.
cBreusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM Test. p value in parenthesis.
Table 8
Forecast Encompassing Regression- 1 to 60 months ahead forecastsa
Countries M-R R-M
constant (yˆt − y∗t ) seb R¯2 LMc constant (y∗t − yˆt) seb R¯2 LMc
UK 0.045∗∗ 0.783∗∗ 0.051 0.849 2.249 0.045∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.051 0.295 2.249
(0.008) (0.052) (0.115) (0.009) (0.052) (0.115)
USA -0.024 1.083∗∗ 0.222 0.894 31.271 -0.024 -0.083 0.222 0.032 31.272
(0.133) (0.154) (0.000) (0.133) (0.154) (0.000)
Two asterisks denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and one asterisk at the 10% level.
aNewey-West corrected standard errors in parenthesis.
bStandard error of regression.
cBreusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM Test. p value in parenthesis.
Table 9
Forecast Encompassing Regression- 12-month-ahead forecasta
Countries M-R R-M
constant (yˆt − y∗t ) seb R¯2 LMc constant (y∗t − yˆt) seb R¯2 LMc
UK 0.028∗∗ 0.808∗∗ 0.052 0.903 1.121 0.028∗∗ 0.192480 0.052 0.338 1.121
(0.008) (0.050) (0.335) (0.008) (0.050) (0.335)
USA 0.0174 1.033∗∗ 0.251 0.889 29.648 0.017 -0.033 0.252 0.008 29.648
(0.045) (0.136) (0.000) (0.045) (0.136) (0.000)
Two asterisks denotes statistical significance at the 5% level and one asterisk at the 10% level.
aNewey-West corrected standard errors in parenthesis.
bStandard error of regression.
cBreusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM Test. p value in parenthesis.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper argues that in both the US and the UK in the interwar period unemployment was determined
by the nonlinear interaction of economic shocks and the political process. In both countries unemployment
moved between a low and a high natural rate of unemployment, supporting the model’s implication that
if there are adverse shocks (usually brought about by a big monetary mistake - the return to gold in the
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UK, and the Fed policy in the aftermath of the Great Crash), voters demand protection and unemployment
benefit relief to deal with the situation. In this way, bad monetary policy breeds a worse supply-side
response and the economy spirals downwards into a ‘vicious circle’, producing a worse equilibrium with a
higher natural rate of unemployment. Movement out of the high unemployment equilibrium occurs because
a large demand or supply shock triggers the ‘virtuous circle’; in these cases this shock was supplied by
rearmament and the second world war. This theory both fits the data in its own terms and is superior in
forecasting performance out of sample to alternative models of ‘generalised hysteresis’ which within sample
are empirically indistinguishable for familiar reasons.
The paper has a number of policy implications. One is that good macroeconomic management has a
role in supporting good supply-side policy. Another is that the education of public opinion in the nature
of the economy and the shocks hitting it can avoid counter-productive demands for social protection. Yet
another is that reform programmes or demand shocks which overall jolt the economy away from the high
unemployment equilibrium can be beneficial.
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Appendix A: The model of median voter choice of Bt
In our model, the median voter holds some non-human capital but nevertheless relies heavily on income
from human capital. If this voter experiences unemployment spells, unemployment benefits yield a much
needed replacement of wage income. This voter’s demands for benefits rise as unemployment rises, but at a
diminishing rate, as these higher benefits progressively raise the chances of unemployment.
We expound this model in the first place under the assumption of rational expectations with full infor-
mation up to time t-1 on the relevant data and full knowledge of all model parameters. Let the (risk-neutral)
median voter’s utility be given purely by a linear function of income so that the mth such voter maximises
at t:
V mt = Et
∞X
i=0
βi
¡
Nmt+isBt+i + [1−Nmt+is]Wt+i + rK − T
¢
(A1)
where β = the voter’s time-preference rate, Nmt+i is the number of spells the mth voter spends unemployed
in year t+i, s =fraction of a year that each spell lasts; r is the rate of return on non-human capital, K, and
T = general per capita taxation (treated as lump sum). In addition this voter faces two constraints. First,
the expected duration of unemployment in t+i (that is s times the expected number of spells) is πt+i which
we write as:
πt+i = π0 + πUt+i ; 0 ≤ πt+i ≤ 1 (A2)
Note that U (the rate of unemployment) = s.(N/POP ) where N/POP is the average number of spells
per head of working population, that is the ‘turnover rate’ (fraction of jobs lost per annum). Therefore if the
median voter is typical; πt+i = Ut+i so that U = π01−π . We expect π0 to be small and positive, on the grounds
that the chances of becoming unemployed never go to zero however low unemployment may go; and π to be
positive and less than unity, if we assume (as we do) that the median voter’s chances of unemployment are
approximately the same as the population’s.
The second constraint comes from the economic model of unemployment of section 2 and is Eq. (A3):
Ut+i = exp(u0 + vt+i).[Bt+i/Wt+i]
δ (A3)
Eq. (A1) can be rewritten, once expectations are taken, as:
V mt =
∞X
i=0
βi (πt+iEtBt+i + [1− πt+i]EtWt+i + rK − T ) (A4)
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Now we will treat W (wages, i.e. productivity) as a random walk. We expect productivity to be non-
stationary (an I(1) process) because productivity growth is by its nature an innovation. If in addition to
this random shock, productivity growth was related to past shocks making it an ARIMA process integrated
of order 1 then future wages would be related to current wages by a linear function of the autocorrelation
and moving average parameters; however for simplicity here we assume it is a simple random walk so that
EtWt+i = Wt. We also assume that the voters can only demand at any point of time a single, constant,
benefit level (because political debate enforces simplicity), and thus they must decide on a single Bt at each
date t; this will not prevent them at a later date demanding a diﬀerent one but at t they cannot demand a
level that is planned to change. From these arguments we may further rewrite (A4) as:
V mt =
1
1− β (Wt + rK − T ) +
¡
π0 + πU t)(Bt −Wt
¢
(A5)
where
U t = exp(u0).
Ã
Et
∞X
i=0
βi exp vt+i
!
[Bt/Wt]
δ (A6)
The first order condition for benefits from maximising (A5) is then:
Bt =Wt
πδU t
π0 + (1 + δ)πU t
(A7)
Inspection of (A7) reveals that median voters will demand a higher benefit-wage ratio as U t rises but at
a diminishing rate. The median voter’s problem is illustrated in Figure 2. The stability condition for the
model is that the slope of the UU curve be greater than that of the BB curve; this also implies that a rise
in expected v causes a rise in benefits demanded.
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Figure 2: Voter choice of BW
For greater tractability we loglinearise (A7) around U0 as:
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lnBt = η(U0) lnU t + lnWt + constant (A8)
where η(U0) =
³
π0
π0+(1+δ)πU0
´
. By making U0 as close as possible to U t the degree of approximation is
minimised; thus we set U0 = U t−1, so that now we have η(U t−1) =
³
π0
π0+(1+δ)πUt−1
´
.
We also have from equation (A3):
lnU t = u0 + δ(lnBt − lnWt) + vet (A9)
17log first diﬀerences of (A7)
d lnBt = d lnWt + d ln
Ã
πδUt
π0 + (1 + δ)πUt
!
= d lnWt + d lnUt − d ln
¡
π0 + (1 + δ)πUt
¢
Using the approximation that
d ln(x+ z) ' x0
x0 + z0
d lnx+
z0
x0 + z0
d ln z
the last term can be rewritten as
³
(1+δ)πU0
π0+(1+δ)πU0
´
d lnUt. Substituting this in yields (A8). The constant of integration is found
as
lnπδ + (1− η) lnU0 − ln
¡
π0 + (1 + δ)πU0
¢
Note that it does not change with U0 and that η(U0) lnUt has the required property that it rises with unemployment at a
diminishing rate.
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where vet =
µ
Et
∞P
i=0
βi exp vt+i
¶
. We can then compactly write the solution for the median voter’s desired
benefits (as illustrated in Fig. A1) in loglinear terms as:
(lnBt − lnWt) =
η
1− δη v
e
t + constant (A10)
The interpretation of (A10) is that voters are altering their benefit demands (which in turn control
changes in the natural rate) in response to that part of unemployment, the persistent cyclical and other
movements, that they cannot control.
At this point we introduce an important information limitation; we have assumed rational expectations
conditional on their information set. However, it is clear that within this model if voters know the correct
value of vt and of the natural rate, U
∗
t , then their demands for benefits would be self-limiting. What would
occur would be that faced with a persistent v shock to unemployment they would demand higher benefits
which would raise unemployment temporarily, until the shock had disappeared. This would produce an
extended cycle in the natural rate and in the benefit-wage ratio around a single steady state equilibrium;
but it would not produce the very large and apparently self-propagating movements in the natural rate of
unemployment during the interwar period that we observed quite widely. However, it is worth bearing such a
model of full information in mind as it is possible that in some countries’ episodes information is suﬃciently
full to avoid this phenomenon and hence produce a single unemployment equilibrium.
Instead we assume that the voters’ general situation is one of limited information about the natural rate
and hence about the other v shocks disturbing unemployment. (By implication they also have limited infor-
mation about the parameters.) This limitation is motivated by the sheer diﬃculty and indeed controversy
that has surrounded the estimation of natural rates for diﬀerent economies. Indeed as recently as the 1970s
it was commonplace among economists influential in policy to deny the existence of a natural rate. Hence
we would argue that for our inter-war episodes it is quite reasonable to assume that voters faced a signal
extraction problem. They observed Ut−1 but could not decompose it into vt−1 and the natural rate. To
solve this in a standard way, we assume that they used past experience (prior to the sample) on the ratio,
ξ, of the variance of vt to the total variance of the unemployment rate. In the model here they apply this
ratio to the rise in unemployment since some initial rate,z. Thus their estimate of vt is:
Et−1vt = ξ(Ut−1 − z) and of the natural rate Et−1U∗t = (1− ξ)(Ut−1 − z). Hence the permanent value
vet = θEt−1vt where θ is determined by the coeﬃcients of the v autocorrelation function and the discount
rate. Et−1U
∗
t is treated as a constant, as it depends on Bt/Wt which is expected to be constant by virtue
of the voter’s optimising choice. We recall that η1−δη is a declining function of U t−1; under our limited
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information assumption this parameter becomes an estimated one, [η1−δη , to be updated on the basis of the
latest estimates of the v shock and the natural rate, in conjunction with other information about the model.
The best estimate of U t−1 is Et−1U t−1 = v
e
t +Et−1U
∗
t = [1− ξ(1− θ)](Ut−1− z). We represent the function
here linearly as:
\η
1− δη = ψ1 − ψ2(Ut−1 − z) (A11)
We can now write:
(lnBt − lnW t) = [ψ1 − ψ2(Ut−1 − z)][θξ(Ut−1 − z)] + constant+ ²t (A12)
where we have added an error term, ²t, to capture the influence of other factors and pieces of information
on the choice of optimal benefits- because these elements may well be persistent, this error term may well
too be autocorrelated.. Hence finally we obtain a reduced form equation for benefits as:
ln(Bt/Wt) = B0 + ϕ(Ut−1 − z)− β(Ut−1 − z)2 + ²t (A13)
which is equation (2) in the main text.
Initially a rise in unemployment above some normal rate, z, would trigger demands for higher benefits,
but as unemployment rises, the rising chances of unemployment become an increasingly restraining factor. In
equation (A13), B0 is a minimum benefit/wage ratio set in normal circumstances and ϕ and β are constants.
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Appendix B: Graphs of Average Earnings and Unemployment Benefits in the UK, 1920-38.
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Data on unemployment benefits was obtained from Hatton (1980) and is a representative benefit level
for male recipients with diﬀerent family circumstances. The weights were based on a sample of 1927 benefit
recipients. Average earnings is the average weekly manufacturing wage obtained from Chapman (1953).
Both of these graphs displays shillings on the y-axis. By the end of the First World War, the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Act of 1911 and amendents in 1916 and 1919, had provided a system of centrally financed
unemployment insurance in Britain to about 25 per cent of the work-force. Before 1911, unemployment
insurance was either privately administered with contributions by workers and employers made payable to
a fund or public assistance for unemployed persons which was locally administered and financed. After the
First World War, the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1920 increased benefits by nearly 40 per cent. The act
also extend coverage to more than 11 million workers. The generosity of the system progressively increased
so that by 1931, weekly benefits exceeded 50 per cent of average weekly wages and also the duration of these
benefits was for unlimited period to those adults who have made at least 30 weekly insurance contributions.
In 1936 and again in 1938, so that on the eve of Britain’s entry into the Second World War, insured workers
were indefinitely eligible to receive benefits to nearly 60 per cent of average wages.
Appendix C: Data Discussion.
The systems of measuring unemployment in interwar UK and USA were markedly diﬀerent. The UK
method of measurement was based on the unemployment insurance system; it was a literal head count
of those individuals who were covered by the insurance scheme and who were unemployed. Until late in
the interwar period, America did not even have an unemployment insurance system, and even once it was
founded, it covered only a small fraction of the work-force. The methodological basis for the American
numbers is a survey (carried out by the U.S Bureau of Labour Statistics) of a sample of individuals which
inquires into their labour force and employment status.
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The data for the UK (1887.01-1939.10) is based on two variables (1887.01-1920.12; Trade Union Mem-
bers Unemployed) and (1921.01-1939.10; Insured Workers Unemployed), the source being the NBER Macro
History Database. These data can be regarded as a single variable as they are based on returns collected
by the Board of Trade and the Ministry of Labour from various trade unions which paid unemployment
benefits.
The data for the US (1906.06-1942.06) is based on two diﬀerent variables (1906.06-1933.01; Unemploy-
ment of Trade Union Members UTT , where UT denotes the number of trade union members unemployed and
T is the number of trade union members) and (1929.01-1942.06; oﬃcial unemployment rate UL , where U is
the number of unemployed and L is the size of the labour force) (note that all figures are in percentage
terms); the source is from the NBER Macro History Database. To convert the first time series into the
oﬃcial unemployment rate UL , we make use of the splicing factor
U
UT
which we calculated using the data
where the two time series overlap, namely the period 1929.01-1933.01. First, we convert the monthly time
series UTT into
UT
L by multiplying it by
T
L , where only yearly data 1906-1933 is available from the US Bureau
of Labour Statistics. We therefore made the assumption that total union membership T is constant over the
year as well as L, the labour force. Then to obtain the splicing factor UUT we take
U
L from the second time
series (over the period 1929.01-1933.01) and divide it by UTL . Finally, to obtain
U
L we multiply
UT
L by the
splicing factor and hence convert the first time series into the second one. Figs. C1 and C2 provide plots of
the two countries unemployment series.
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Appendix D: A statistical test of mean diﬀerence in using diﬀerent lags specification in the Political
Process.
We can test the hypothesis of whether the one-lag outcomes are statistically diﬀerent from the twelve-lag
ones. The test proposed is a statistical testing which involves the sampling distribution of the diﬀerence
between means of our parameters (aˆ0, aˆ1, aˆ2) given that these three parameters are the ones that generate
the equilibria outcomes. This test is performed at diﬀerent lags (namely the first and the twelveth one)
with the mean diﬀerence given by aˆ1 − aˆ12 where the superscripts denote the order of the lags. The
mean and standard deviation of the sampling distribution of the diﬀerence between means are given by
a1 − a12 and Saˆ1−aˆ12 respectively. The latter is the standard error of the diﬀerence between means. Since
the sample standard deviation is used to estimate the population value, the sampling distribution of the
diﬀerence between means will also be distributed as t and the formula for the test statistic is given by:
t = (aˆ
1−aˆ12)−(a1−a12)
Saˆ1−aˆ12
. The null hypothesis says that H0:a
1 − a12, that is, the two means come from the
same population; there is no diﬀerence between them (i.e., a1 − a12 = 0). Thus, the formula reduces to
t = (aˆ
1−aˆ12)
Saˆ1−aˆ12
. The formula for the standard error for dependent groups because the same variables are tested
twice is given by Saˆ1−aˆ12 =
q
S2aˆ1 + S
2
aˆ12 − 2 ∗ r ∗ Saˆ1 ∗ Saˆ12 where r is the correlation between the two sets of
parameters. Given we are dealing with a two-tailed test where the alternative hypothesis is H1:a
1 6= a12, the
critical value for a 5% level of significance test is ±1.96. Table D1 summarises our analysis and results for the
comparison of statistical significance diﬀerence between one-lag outcomes and both twelve-lag and two-lag
outcomes. We choose to compare one-lag outcomes to both two-lag and twelve-lag outcomes in order to see
whether the political economy process significantly diﬀers at various lags. The outcomes indicate robustness
of the results at shorter time lag but this robustness soon disappears as the time lag increases. However the
main results of three equilibria do not change as we move from the one-lag to the twelve-lag specification as
illustrated in the main text.
Table D1
Statistical Significance of diﬀerence between lag outcomes for the Political Process
1-lag v/s 12-lag UK USA
H0 a
1
0 − a120 = 0 a11 − a121 = 0 a12 − a122 = 0 a10 − a120 = 0 a11 − a121 = 0 a12 − a122 = 0
H1 a
1
0 − a120 6= 0 a11 − a121 6= 0 a12 − a122 6= 0 a10 − a120 6= 0 a11 − a121 6= 0 a12 − a122 6= 0
t = (aˆ
1−aˆ12)
Saˆ1−aˆ12
-4.05 6.57 -5.76 -8.19 10.5 -4.94
Decision
Rule
Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0
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1-lag v/s 2- lag UK USA
H0 a
1
0 − a20 = 0 a11 − a21 = 0 a12 − a22 = 0 a10 − a20 = 0 a11 − a21 = 0 a12 − a22 = 0
H1 a
1
0 − a20 6= 0 a11 − a21 6= 0 a12 − a22 6= 0 a10 − a20 6= 0 a11 − a21 6= 0 a12 − a22 6= 0
t = (aˆ
1−aˆ12)
Saˆ1−aˆ12
0.12 0.01 -0.01 -1.06 1.50 -1.86
Decision
Rule
Accept H0 Accept H0 Accept H0 Accept H0 Accept H0 Accept H0
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